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 Abstract 
Basic public pension schemes and cut backs in earnings-related public pensions led to an 
increasing role of supplementary pensions such as pension funds for old-age incomes. In 
addition to demographic changes that challenge public pensions, private pensions face 
financial market risks. To what extent are the scope of pension fund capitalism and the 
impact of financial crises on pension funds related to different institutional arrangements?  
Given that different production regimes reflect different pension systems, we expect 
systematic diversities with regard to the public-private pension mix and the specific design of 
supplementary pensions. These varieties should be mirrored in different forms of 
vulnerability of pension funds to financial market crises. We hypothesize a higher scope of 
pension fund capitalism and vulnerability to financial market crises in countries with 
predominant market-based coordination mechanisms and short term strategies on financial 
markets (i.e. Liberal Market Economies). 
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I.  Introduction1 
In the past few decades we have seen a shift from public pension systems toward private 
pension systems, particularly in the form of funded occupational pensions. In addition to 
insurance contracts, pension funds are the big winners of this development. This cross-
country trend goes hand in hand with country specific peculiarities. The scope and form of 
pension funds differ in terms of lower and higher importance for the old-age income, 
contingent upon the level of public pensions (Bismarck versus Beveridge system). In 
addition, pension funds consider the interests of their beneficiaries in different ways, 
depending on the governance form (employer‘s commitment or collective agreement) as well 
as the organization and participating actors (market, firms, social partners, state). Given that 
different production regimes reflect different pension systems – in line with the Varieties of 
Capitalism approach (VoC) – we expect systematic diversities regarding the public-private 
pension mix and the specific design of supplementary pensions. These varieties should be 
mirrored in different forms of vulnerability to financial market crises. This article contributes to 
the scientific evaluation of the current financial crisis and adapts the VoC approach to 
multipillar-pension systems. In practice, this article aims to show mechanisms and 
regulations that help to reduce pension funds‘ vulnerability to financial crises. 
Financial markets and state economies worldwide are still facing the heaviest financial crises 
since the Second World War. Not only states and banks, but almost all investment players, 
including pension funds, have to deal with stock market turmoil and losses. Although the 
economic and financial problems in each country are similar, the impact of the turbulences 
has varied. We have already gained descriptive knowledge about the impact of this 
development on funded pensions (OECD, 2008a, 2009: 25f; Antolin and Stewart, 2009; Pino 
and Yermo, 2010), but what is still missing is a theoretical underpinning in the form of 
analytical explanations. Some authors refer to the form and scope of the overall public-
private pension mix and the institutional embeddedness in order to explain the impact of 
pension fund capitalism on financial markets (Jackson and Vitols, 2001). We are more 
interested in the reverse effect: the impact of financial markets and their crises on pension 
funds. Therefore, we question to which degree the scope of pension fund capitalism and the 
impact of financial crises on pension funds are related to different institutional arrangements. 
Following the VoC approach, non-market based coordination is inherent to Coordinated 
Market Economies (CMEs) whereas Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) pursue coordination 
via market mechanisms. We try to explain the different vulnerabilities of pension fund 
capitalisms to financial crises by applying the central ideas of the VoC approach. 
                                                     
1
 The author would like to thank the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the Pension Research Network (FNA) 
for their support. This paper was partly written in summer 2011 during a research stay at the Institute for Advanced 
Studies (IHS) Vienna. I am grateful for valuable comments received from the anonymous reviewer. 
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Related to interdependencies between production regimes, social policies and welfare 
states, the following hypotheses will be tested: countries, in which market-based 
coordination mechanisms and short term strategies on financial markets are predominant, 
are more likely to have a higher scope of pension fund capitalism and vulnerability to 
financial market crises. Since these features characterize liberal market economies, one can 
assume a higher impact of financial crises on pension funds in such countries. 
The next section provides an overview of recent analyses concerning the impact of the 
financial crisis on social policies. We then introduce the core arguments and hypotheses 
drawing on the framework of the VoC approach. Afterwards, the scope and coordination 
mechanisms of pension fund capitalisms will be analyzed separated into the categories of 
liberal market economies, coordinated market economies, and mixed/Mediterranean market 
economies. The fourth section takes a closer look at the assets and investments of pension 
funds in different market economies, including the development during the financial crisis 
2007-09. Based on the analysis of various data sets, the results show interdependencies 
between production regime, pension fund capitalism, and the vulnerability to the financial 
crisis and with it systematic differences between LMEs and CMEs/MMEs. 
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II.  Financial crisis and social policy 
The scientific evaluation and research regarding the recent financial crisis is still in its 
infancy. The majority of the studies so far have analyzed economic or employment politics 
and have looked at state intervention (Datz, 2009; Eichhorst et al., 2010; Euzéby, 2010; 
Chung and Thewissen, 2011; Starke et al., forthcoming), with some observers expecting 
countries to react to external shocks such as the financial crisis according to specific 
production regimes (Iversen, 2007). Furthermore, only a handful of analyses have explicitly 
focused on the impact on pensions; furthermore these studies have mainly been from a 
descriptive perspective (OECD, 2008a, 2009: 25f; Antolin and Stewart, 2009; Pino and 
Yermo, 2010). Exceptions are comparative studies about the impact of the financial crisis on 
pensions in Eastern Europe (Schmähl, 2011). What is missing is a theoretical underpinning. 
Few authors emphasize the bigger impact of the financial crisis in LMEs when compared 
with CMEs, with reference to theories concerning comparative capitalism, thereby neglecting 
the effect on pensions (Nölke, 2009). 
Another strand of literature has pointed to the relationship between market economies, 
welfare states, and social politics while stressing the role of employers and their attitudes 
toward social benefits for the development of welfare states (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2001; 
Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Mares, 2003; Schröder, 2008). Findings concerning the impact of 
pension systems and the public-private pension mix on financial markets reveal that the 
financing of public pensions and the scope and regulation of supplementary pensions 
together with their institutional embeddedness are responsible for the differences between 
LMEs and CMEs (Jackson and Vitols, 2001). In contrast, the article in hand focuses on the 
reverse effect, the impact of financial markets on private pensions. This study brings 
together two strands of literature in order to fill the research gaps in the theoretical 
underpinning of the financial crisis and the impact of financial markets on private pensions. 
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III.  Market economy – pension fund capitalism – financial 
crisis  
The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach distinguishes between two main configurations 
of market economies – LMEs and CMEs – depending on different forms of coordination and 
cooperation of firms in five sub-spheres (industrial relations, vocational training and 
education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations, employees-management relations) 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). It is assumed that market economies differ systematically from one 
another. The more these spheres are complementary, the higher comparative advantages 
are. CMEs, which are based more on non-market mechanisms in order to overcome 
coordination problems, and LMEs, which rely on market based mechanisms, are the two 
ideal-types along which other countries can be benchmarked. Mediterranean Market 
Economies (MMEs) share characteristics from both LMEs and CMEs, with more capacities 
for non-market coordination but also market mechanisms within industrial relations (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001: 21). Since the arguments of the VoC approach have been successfully 
extended to social policy and welfare states (Ebbinghaus and Manow, 2001; Estevez-Abe et 
al., 2001) and even to aggregate demand management (Soskice, 2007), where CMEs ‘ 
monetary institutions act more conservative, we expand the VoC-concept to pensions and in 
particular to pension funds. Following VoC, we use institutional arrangements as an 
explanation for financial crisis‘ vulnerability. We assume that systematic interdependencies 
exist between the form of market economy and the design of pension funds as well as the 
impact of financial crises. Even though we partly find well established pension fund systems 
in CMEs, they differ from their liberal counterparts in design and members‘ involvement. Not 
only the importance and level of pension fund investments, but also their design and degree 
of (organized) coordination matter. In CMEs the role of pension fund capitalism is growing, 
however this is based on demographic changes and increasing public debts, but in line with 
CMEs‘ need for coordination. The nature of coordination depends in turn on the institutional 
environment and its embeddedness. We hypothesize that pension funds are lower regulated 
in countries with mainly market-based mechanisms of coordination, while investments in 
shares are higher in countries with financial markets based on short-term strategies. Since 
this reflects the picture of LMEs, countries are more vulnerable to financial crises (with 
losses mainly of shares) when they show core features of LMEs. We have formed four 
working hypotheses based on these conclusions: 
1) Due to basic public pension schemes with low replacement rates and a higher 
importance of financial markets for the overall economy, LMEs tend more toward 
matured pension fund capitalism. In contrast, CMEs show a lower tendency toward 
pension fund capitalism because of earnings-related public pensions with high 
replacement rates and lower importance of financial markets for the overall 
economy. 
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2) The regulation and coordination of pension funds as well as the involvement of their 
members‘ interests is lower in LMEs than in CMEs. 
3) LMEs have a higher percentage of investments in equities, whereas CMEs invest 
more in bonds and loans. 
4) LMEs are more vulnerable to financial market crises than CMEs. 
Table 1 summarizes the main expectations for LMEs and CMEs according to the VoC 
approach. 
Table 1: Theoretical expectations 
 
LME CME 
Coordination market-based non-market based (organised) 
Pension fund capitalism  stronger (matured) weaker (developing) 
Employees‘/pensioners‘ interests no/weak involvement (stronger) involvement 
Financial market strategies  short-term (equities) long-term (bonds) 
Impact of financial crisis higher lower 
 
III.1  Methods and case selection 
In order to analyse the interdependencies between market economy, pension fund 
capitalism, and vulnerability concerning financial market crises, 19 OECD countries have 
been selected according to data availability (see Table 2). Since data are limited to pension 
funds, other private pensions such as insurances, book reserves, and PAYGO-systems have 
not been taken into consideration. We recognise that there might be differences within 
countries between individual pension funds (which can deviate from the country average); 
but in order to analyze country and regime specific patterns, the country-level is chosen as 
the sample-level. By pension funds we mean  
―(...) the pool of assets forming an independent legal entity that are bought with the 
contributions to a pension plan for the exclusive purpose of financing pension plan 
benefits. The plan/fund members have a legal or beneficial right or some other 
contractual claim against the assets of the pension fund. Pension funds take the form 
of either a special purpose entity with legal personality (such as a trust, foundation, or 
corporate entity) or a legally separated fund without legal personality managed by a 
dedicated provider (pension fund management company) or other financial institution 
on behalf of the plan/fund members.‖ (OECD, 2005: 16). 
Since the financial crisis mainly affected financial markets and especially stock markets, the 
development of the value of shares is used as the main indicator for vulnerability. 
Unfortunately, no data are available for the development of shares at the macro-level in 
times of economic prosperity. Therefore we should keep in mind that, in general, shares 
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show higher rates of return compared to bonds and loans when markets perform well. For 
these reasons we cannot compare rates of return in times of crisis to the previous period. 
Thus we operationalize ―vulnerability‖ as the development of shares‘ rates of return during 
the crisis. Even if we can expect higher returns before and after crises, the change of value 
in the current period of financial turmoil, which seems to be longer than originally expected 
(2008-present), has a huge impact e.g. for pensioners close to retirement in the absent of 
life-cycle investments and also for the long-term development as the returns on foregone 
investments will be missing. Even if pension funds will partly recover soon, the effects of the 
crisis remain present, undermining the expected long-term growth of, but also the trust in, 
funded pensions. 
Table 2: Case selection  
 Countries 
Liberal Market Economies AU, CA, IE, NZ, UK, US 
Coordinated Market Economies AT, BE, CH, DE, DK, FI, NL, NO, SE 
Mediterranean Market Economies FR, IT, PT, ES 
Sources: Hall and Soskice (2001: 19-21).  
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IV.  Results 
IV.1  Scope of pension fund capitalism 
According to our first working hypothesis we expect LMEs to have only basic pension 
schemes with low replacement rates. This holds true for most of our LMEs since they come 
with Beveridge or Beveridge-lite public pension systems that offer replacement rates below 
60% of individuals‘ former income. Canada and the US as outliers have integrated earnings-
related benefits in their Bismarck-lite public pension systems. Linked to public basic pension 
systems, occupational pension systems are more important for LMEs, mainly on a voluntary 
basis. Nevertheless, in Australia superannuation funds have been obligatory since 1992; 
while employees in the UK can opt-out of the earnings-related part of the public pension 
scheme in favor of occupational or personal pensions. Similarly, New Zealander employees 
are entitled to opt-out from the 2007 introduced mandatory KiwiSaver system (occupational 
pensions).  
The picture emerging from the analysis of the CMEs is mixed, not completely in line with our 
hypothesis. Besides countries with Bismarckian public pensions and voluntary occupational 
pensions, countries such as Switzerland, Finland and Norway offer only low replacement 
rates in their public pension schemes together with mandatory occupational pensions. In 
addition, we find quasi-mandatory occupational pensions based on extended collective 
agreements in Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden. The MMEs have very generous 
public pensions; only in France is an obligatory occupational pension scheme (PAYGO-
financed) needed in order to obtain a decent living standard for the elderly. 
In general, the need for additional supplementary pensions and pensions funds is higher in 
LMEs than in CMEs and MMEs. If we look at the scope of pension fund capitalism, 
measured as investments in percentage of the GDP, the size of pension funds is highest in 
LMEs, the average being 63% compared to 45.5% for CMEs and only 6.2% for MMEs (see 
Table 3). However, deviations are very high in the group of CMEs, reflecting the dualised 
structure of occupational pensions with partly (quasi-)mandatory and partly voluntary 
occupational pensions. We observe similar patterns if we look at the contributions and 
benefits of pension funds. If we relate the amount of contributions to pension funds with the 
benefits they have to pay, the future situation in Great Britain, the United States, Denmark, 
Finland, and Portugal seems less sustainable as their expenditures outnumber their 
revenues (not taking into consideration rates of return and reserves). Even if CMEs do not 
form a homogenous block in terms of high public pensions and voluntary-only forms of 
occupational pensions in line with our first hypothesis, the participation rules of pension 
funds are highly regulated – either mandated by the state or erga omnes extension via 
collective agreements – in contrast to the majority of LMEs. 
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Table 3: Scope of pension fund capitalism 2010 (% GDP) 
 
All funds  Pension funds 
 
Investments 
 
Investments 
2001/10 
∆ 
Contributions 
2001/10 
∆ 
Benefits 
2001/10 
∆ 
AU (m)  93.8  91.0 21 8.3 14 4.6 4 
CA (v)  128.3  64.7 23 2.8 88 2.5 17 
IE (v)  44.2
a
  49.1 12 - - - - 
NZ (v)  13.8  13.8 -6 2.3 15 1.3 -39 
UK (v)  80.5
a
  86.6 12 2.7
a
 66 3.2
a
 10 
US (v)  119.1  72.6 2 3.8
b
 20 4.3
b
 4 
LME 
mean 80.0 
 
63.0 11 4.0 40 3.2 -1 
LME CV 0.55  0.45  0.62  0.42  
AT (v)  5.4  5.3 79 0.4
a
 -3 0.2
a
 17 
BE (v)  3.8  3.8 -32 0.4 -5 0.2 -43 
CH (m)  111.9
a
  111.9
a
 9 8.4
a
 28 5.5
a
 16 
DE (v)  5.2  5.2 51 0.5 411 0.2 42 
DK (qm)  177.8  49.7 83 0.6 -48 0.7 23 
FI (m)  91.0  82.1 66 9.7 -1 10.4 23 
NL (qm)  134.9  134.9 32 4.7 68 4.1 37 
NO  (m)  7.8  7.8 41 0.4 -12 0.2 0 
SE (qm)  56.4
a
  8.4
a
 3 - - - - 
CME 
mean 66.0 
 
45.5 37 3.1 55 2.7 14 
CME CV 1.00  1.14  1.26  1.39  
FR (v)  8.8
a
  0.8
b
 -38
c
 - - - - 
IT (v)  5.3  4.6 103 0.6 115 0.2 26 
PT (v)  12.3  11.4 0 0.3 -84 0,7 -54 
ES (v)  9.3  7.9 37 0.5 -54 0.4 -14 
MME 
mean 8.9 
 
6.2 25 0.5 -8 0.4 -14 
MME CV 0.32  0.73  0.33  0.58  
Sources: OECD Global Pension Statistics. 
Notes: Occupational pensions: v=voluntary, qm=quasi-mandatory, m=mandatory; a=2009, 
b=2008 c=2003/08. All funds: pension funds, pension insurance contracts, investment 
companies and bank managed funds, others. 
 
 
  
I H S — Wiß / Pension Fund Capitalism and Financial Crisis — 15 
IV.2  Regulation of pension fund capitalism 
In order to update the VoC approach for multipillar-pension systems, it is important to look 
beyond the scope of pension fund capitalism to the degree of regulation and coordination. 
Who is involved in the regulation and how strict the rules for pension funds are has 
implications for market economies since different ways to solve coordination problems are 
possible. The more members and beneficiaries of pension funds participate directly or via 
trade unions and employers‘ associations in the regulation and organization of pension 
funds, the more organized and coordinated pension fund capitalism is. In a similar vein, state 
regulations might set standards (in contrast to market standards). Thus, we hypothesized in 
CMEs a higher degree of regulation and coordination of pension funds together with a 
stronger involvement of members‘ interests as compared to LMEs. As a first hint in this 
direction, the former section showed regulated coverage mechanisms in particular for CMEs‘ 
(quasi-)mandatory schemes. 
In addition to coverage, pension indexation, investment restrictions, and insolvency 
protection can theoretically be state-mandated. A high degree of regulation means 
strategically coordinated pension fund capitalism and should result in fewer losses for 
beneficiaries. Even if mainly state regulated, regulation in general functions as non-market 
coordination. For the measure of regulation we make use of a very simple index in order to 
show the differences between LMEs, CMEs, and MMEs. Drawing on OECD reports, we 
distinguish between pension indexation, investment restrictions and insolvency protection 
according to whether state regulations exist (score 1) or not (score 0). We have chosen 
these three indicators because of their comparative availability and because of their 
important function for the avoidance of decreasing benefits (indexations), negative return 
rates due to a high exposure to shares (investment restrictions) and losses of benefit claims 
due to employers‘/funds insolvency (insolvency protection). Indexation of pension benefits in 
the pay-out period is almost not visible in LMEs, apart from Ireland and contracted-out 
defined benefit schemes in the UK. Contrastingly, two thirds of the CME-countries specify 
indexation mechanisms and even three out of our four MME-countries do as well (see Table 
4). The picture becomes clear if we look at investment restrictions. All LMEs as well as the 
CMEs Sweden and the Netherlands are following the prudent person principle with only 
qualitative restrictions, whereas the majority of CMEs and all MMEs quantitatively limit 
investments in risky assets. Still, we observe more requirements for insolvency protection in 
LMEs than in CMEs and MMEs, most likely because in LMEs occupational pensions are 
responsible for a high share of old-age income. In sum, the total average changes the 
picture again: CMEs and MMEs are higher regulated than LMEs. 
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Table 4: Index of regulation 
 LMEs CMEs MMEs 
Pension indexation 0.33 0.66 0.75 
Investment restrictions 0.00 0.77 1.00 
Insolvency protection 0.50 0.44 0.25 
Total average 0.28 0.62 0.67 
Sources: Own calculation based on OECD (2008b). 
Notes: Average; pension indexation: 0=no rules, 1=state rules/discretionary/self regulated; 
investment restrictions: 0=prudent person rule, 1=quantitative restrictions; insolvency 
protection: 0=no insolvency protection, 1=insolvency protection. 
 
The higher regulation and non-market based coordination of pension funds in CMEs (and 
partly in MMEs) is, in addition to state regulations, reflected in a high number of collective 
agreements in these countries. In order to further develop the VoC approach and its 
application for multipillar-pension systems, we need to analyze the coordination mechanisms 
within pension funds, e.g. the inclusion of members‘ interests via social partners in collective 
agreements and boards. In general, and related to our second hypothesis, we find more 
collective forms of pension funds in CMEs and MMEs, where social partners jointly 
coordinate and administrate occupational pensions via collective agreements and collective 
pension schemes as well as bipartite governing boards or supervising committees 
(Ebbinghaus and Wiß, 2011: 367-371). The collective and self-administered quasi-public 
schemes in France and Finland together with negotiated sector-wide occupational pensions 
in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, and Germany balance interests between 
sponsors, beneficiaries and investment managers more equally and are an expression of 
more coordination than the employer led funds (e.g. trusts) in Great Britain, the United 
States, Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand with limited rights and influence of members‘ 
representatives (see also Ebbinghaus and Wiß, 2011: 355-358).  
In the Netherlands, social partners jointly negotiate and administer pension funds within a 
state provided regulatory framework (Anderson, 2011). Administrative boards (parity 
representation) are e.g. the key actors for decision about indexation, contribution rates, 
deficits, and surpluses. Swedish occupational pension schemes are based on collective 
agreements as well, without an involvement of the government in design and implementation 
(Lindquist and Wadensjö, 2011). Since 2001, occupational pensions based on collective 
agreements are increasing in Germany, in addition to the traditional employer-provided 
occupational pensions (Wiß, 2011). In sectors such as the metal, chemical, and construction 
industry, social partners have founded collective pension schemes with parity representation 
and administrative or advisory boards, which are e.g. responsible for contracts with financial 
companies and the overall investment strategy. Even in MMEs with high public pensions, 
social partners have became more important for occupational pensions, although the 
development has been triggered by a top-down process. Nevertheless, the social partners 
are responsible for the Tfr (severance pay) in Italy as a gate to occupational pensions 
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(Jessoula, 2011). The latter are based on collective agreements in the case of (the dominant) 
closed pension funds and executive boards with representatives from employers and 
employees appoint e.g. the fund representative.  
In contrast, LMEs follow a shareholder model of corporate governance and company 
pension funds, leaving a very little impact to unions (Bridgen and Meyer, 2011). Reforms in 
Britain since 1995 have emphasized more representativeness in trust membership. Similar 
rules concerning employees‘ representation apply to Australia and New Zealand, where the 
appointment of trusts that are responsible for the management, operation, and investment of 
funds does not require member or employee trustees (OECD, 2008b: 502-511, 486-493). 
In addition to the strong role of social partners within the process of implementation of 
occupational pensions in CMEs, they are also important players within the political process 
of state regulations due to their expertise in this field and due to the consensual political 
systems. Contrastingly, social partners and trade unions in particular are less involved in the 
firm organized occupational pensions in LMEs, where the government is less dependent on 
them due to their lower expertise. Furthermore, due to the majoritarian political system in 
LMEs, there is no need to include social partners in the political process (in contrast to the 
representative political systems in CMEs and MMEs) of state regulation (that are lower 
anyway). 
Experiences from the current financial crisis show that committees and supervisory boards of 
pension funds with required representation of members‘ interests, such as parity of trade 
unions and employers, existent in particular in CMEs and MMEs, performed better and with 
fewer losses than their liberal counterparts with pension funds often ignoring members‘ 
interests (see also Pino and Yermo, 2010: 21f). Within committees and boards, especially 
investments committees, pension fund members‘ representatives make investments of 
pension funds in CMEs more sustainable and prudent in line with the interests of insured 
persons and pensioners and with a long-term perspective. However, employers and pension 
fund managers in LMEs formally not bound to interests of pension fund members are more 
attracted by return rates as high as possible and therefore follow more short-term investment 
strategies with higher profits but riskier assets which are exposed to turmoil.  
In all countries we find state regulations, but to different extents. According to our index of 
regulation, they are stronger in MMEs and CMEs than in LMEs. In addition, regulatory space 
is filled with joint agreements and rules of social partners in CMEs and MMEs, in contrast to 
LMEs, where trusts and firms have more freedom of choice. Even if state regulation in both 
CMEs/MMEs and LMEs are existent in order to guarantee certain minimum conditions – in 
line with path dependencies of public social policy – the VoC approach clearly explains the 
differences in collective regulations in order to overcome coordination problems. 
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IV.3  Investments of pension funds 
Before analysing the portfolio allocation, we want to show the development of pension fund 
assets. Since no data are available from the years previous to 2001, we can only interpret 
the development between 2001 and 2009. According to our third and fourth hypothesis, we 
expect more vulnerability to turmoil and higher losses for pension funds in LMEs due to a 
higher percentage of equities in the investment portfolio in line with short-term investments 
strategies. 
On average, investments and assets of pension funds are higher in LMEs than in CMEs and 
MMEs. Between 2001 and 2009, LMEs‘ pension fund assets averaged out at 56% compared 
to 38% for CMEs (18% without Switzerland and the Netherlands) and only 6% for MMEs 
(see Figure 1). The gap between LMEs and CMEs over time is quite constant, with a slight 
convergence around 2008, immediately followed again by divergence in 2009. It seems that 
the steeper growth of pension funds in CMEs widens the gap between the latter and MMEs. 
What clearly emerges is the massive drop of pension fund assets in LMEs and CMEs in 
2002 and 2008 due to financial market crises. The decline of assets in 2008 was highest in 
LMEs with -19.9% (2002: -12.6%), followed by CMEs with -10.9% (2002: -8.3), and MMEs 
with -10.6% (2002: 0%). 
Figure 1: Development of pension fund assets 2001-2009 (% GDP) 
 
Sources: OECD Global Pension Statistics. 
Notes: Averages. MMEs: 2001/02/09: without France. 
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conclusions about short-term or long-term financial strategies depending on whether equities 
or bonds and loans are the main financial vehicles. According to the third hypothesis, we 
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more likely as well as losses in the event of turmoil, whereas bonds and loans are less risky 
investments with lower but more stable rates of return. The results of country specific 
pension funds‘ investment portfolio, shown in Figure 2, support our expectations. On 
average, the share of equities in LMEs in their total investment portfolio is 45% in 2009, 
much higher than in CMEs (25%) and three times more than in MMEs (15%). Even if Finland 
and Portugal stand out of their groups with a higher share of equities, the coefficient of 
variation is below 0.5 (LMEs: 0.19, CMEs: 0.4, MMEs: 0.4) and confirms a rather consistent 
picture. The same holds true for the share of bonds in total investments in 2009. Here, the 
percentage of bonds in MMEs (55%) and CMEs (52%) is as twice as high as in LMEs (27%), 
in accordance with the long-term oriented investment strategies in Mediterranean and 
coordinated market economies and the short-term oriented strategies in liberal market 
economies. The groups are very homogenous with low deviations between 0.1 and 0.3. 
Figure 2: Pension funds’ investment portfolio 2009 (in % of total investment) 
 
Sources: OECD Global Pension Statistics. 
Notes: Ireland and Sweden: 2008. No data for France and New Zealand. 
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crises, assets in bonds are increasing. Between 2002 and 2006, the percentage of equities 
gains in importance especially in CMEs and MMEs. Although not changing the overall 
picture, taking into account the long-term investment vehicle loans additionally widens the 
gap between CMEs and LMEs.  In line with our hypotheses, LMEs are following short-term 
investment strategies over time in contrast to long-term investment strategies in CMEs and 
MMEs. Due to the higher share of equities in LMEs, we hypothesized higher losses in times 
of financial crises because of their risky nature. 
Figure 3: Development of selected investment categories (in % investment portfolio) 
Sources: Own calculations based on OECD 
Global Pensions Statistics and Institutional Investors‘ Assets dataset. 
Notes: Without France and New Zealand because of missing data. Since in a few countries 
the share of mutual funds, for which a breakdown into equities and bonds is not available, is 
high, we estimated the share of equities and bonds according to the share in all mutual funds 
at country level (aggregated). 
 
What is the impact of financial crises on equities and pension funds? In order to find an 
answer, we compare the share of equities of 2007, which was also a crisis year, with the 
investment returns in 2008 (see Figure 4). In this way, we get a strong correlation of equities‘ 
share and investment losses (r=-0.88). Pension funds with substantial investments in 
equities are more likely to have high losses in times of financial turbulences. Besides Great 
Britain, most of the LMEs had a high share of equities and sustained heavy deficits in 2008, 
whereas CMEs and MMEs, with lower shares of equities, performed less poorly. Finland and 
the Netherlands, having more risky investments and higher losses than the average CME, 
are in between the two groups. Since mainly LMEs have high shares of equities in their 
pension fund portfolios, pension funds in LMEs are more vulnerable to financial market 
crises, confirming our third and fourth hypothesis. 
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Figure 4: Correlation of share of equities and losses in times of crisis 
 
Sources: OECD (2009: 34), OECD Global Pension Statistics. 
Notes: No data for France and New Zealand. 
 
IV.4  Market economy – pension fund capitalism – financial crisis 
We can conclude from the former sections that LMEs have a higher share of equities in 
pension funds‘ portfolio allocation and that LMEs are more vulnerable to financial market 
crises. But is the type of market economy, the scope of pension fund capitalism, and the 
market turmoil‘s sensitivity interrelated and if so, how? To answer these questions, the 
following part quantitatively examines possible interdependencies. Beyond the more 
descriptive results, the aim of this section is a theory driven empirical underpinning with 
―hard facts‖. We first look systematically and grouped around CMEs/MMEs and LMEs at the 
correlation between market economy and pension fund capitalism and second at the relation 
between market economy and financial crisis. For the measurement of the type of market 
economy, we draw on the coordination index of Hall and Gingerich (2004) since coordination 
is the core feature that distinguishes a LME from a CME. Variables for the coordination in 
labor relations (level of wage coordination, degree of wage coordination, and labor turnover) 
together with variables for coordination in corporate governance (shareholder power, 
dispersion of control, and size of stock market) in the 1990s build the overall coordination 
index. Based on a standardized factor analysis from 0 to 1, in countries with higher values 
strategic coordination is more important than market coordination (Hall and Gingerich, 2004: 
10-17). In addition, we use bargaining coverage and the status of works councils as 
supplementary indicators for strategic coordination. 
Market economy and pension fund capitalism 
Confirming our theoretical framework, the type of market economy is highly related to the 
scope and regulation of pension fund capitalism. The higher the coordination in a country, 
the lower its amount of pension fund assets (see Figure 5). In LMEs with a low degree of 
strategic coordination private pensions are more important and pension funds assets higher 
than in CMEs, reflecting lower benefits in their public pension schemes. In contrast, strategic 
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coordination is more important in countries that belong to the CME/MME-group. High 
replacement rates in public pension schemes reduce the need for private pensions and with 
it pension funds assets. If we exclude the two special cases Switzerland and the Netherlands 
with (quasi-)mandatory occupational pensions, the correlation between coordination and 
pension fund capitalism is even stronger. The more descriptive results regarding the relation 
between market economy and share of equities from section IV.3 are also confirmed by 
Figure 5. Production regimes based on market coordination highly correspond with 
substantial shares of equities in pension funds‘ investment portfolios. If we use the average 
collective bargaining coverage or status and existence of works councils (2001-2009), 
instead of the coordination index, as indicators for strategic coordination and the involvement 
of employees‘ and pensioners‘ interests, we find similar patterns. As a result, countries which 
follow strategic coordination mechanisms make fewer investments in equities but rather 
invest in secure financial vehicles such as bonds and loans. In sum, market coordination 
(LMEs) goes hand in hand with developed pension fund capitalism, less involvement of 
pension fund members‘ interests, short-term financial strategies and a higher share of 
equities. 
Figure 5: Relations between market economy and pension fund capitalism 
Sources: Coordination index: Hall and Gingerich (2004); pension fund assets 2001-2009 
(average): own calculations based on OECD Global Pension Statistics; share of equities 
2001-2009 (average): own calculations based on OECD Global Pension Statistics and 
Institutional Investors‘ Assets dataset. 
Notes: No data for share of equities for France and New Zealand. 
 
Market economy and financial crisis 
In general, short-term market strategies with investments mainly in riskier assets such as 
equities make higher rates of return more likely. However, these investment categories imply 
the risk of higher losses in times of financial market turbulences. As we were able to 
illustrate, LMEs have a higher equity exposure than LMEs. Additionally, Figure 4 points to the 
fact that pension funds‘ investment in LMEs suffered more during the financial crisis than in 
CMEs. If we take the coordination index as an indicator of the degree of strategic 
coordination in order to separate a LME from a CME, Figure 6 underpins the message. 
AU 
CA 
IE 
NZ 
UK 
US 
AT 
BE 
CH 
DE 
DK 
FI 
NL 
NO 
SE 
FR IT 
ES 
PT 
0 
20 
40 
60 
80 
100 
120 
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1 
P
en
si
o
n
 f
u
n
d
 a
ss
et
s’
 m
ea
n
 2
0
0
1
-
0
9
 (
%
 G
D
P
) 
Coordination index 
AU 
CA 
IE UK US 
AT 
BE CH 
DE DK 
FI 
NL 
NO 
SE 
IT ES 
PT 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1 S
h
a
r
e
 o
f 
e
q
u
it
ie
s 
2
0
0
1
-0
9
 (
%
 t
o
ta
l 
in
v
e
st
m
e
n
ts
) 
Coordination index 
I H S — Wiß / Pension Fund Capitalism and Financial Crisis — 23 
Pension funds performed better during the financial crisis 2008 in countries that follow 
mechanisms of strategic coordination, even if their return rates are negative as well. We see 
a strong positive relationship between the real investment return in 2008 and the degree of 
strategic coordination. Due to the very high equity exposure, pension funds in Ireland lost 
most money in 2008. If we use the average collective bargaining coverage between 2001 
and 2009, the picture slightly changes but still shows a medium-strong correlation (see 
Figure 6). Countries with a higher collective bargaining coverage, which is important for 
occupational pensions and pension funds based on collective agreements, had smaller 
deficits. Our third indicator, the status of works councils (whether they are existent with 
rights, voluntary or not existent) shows an even higher positive correlation (r=0.7). As a 
result, short-term market strategies, a high equity exposure and negative investment returns 
are interrelated. Pension funds in LMEs are faced with a higher vulnerability to financial 
market crises than CMEs, verifying our fourth hypothesis. 
Figure 6: Relations between market economy and investment returns 2008 
 
Sources: Coordination index: Hall and Gingerich (2004); Investment returns: OECD (2009: 
34). Collective bargaining coverage 2001-09 (average): ICTWSS dataset. 
Notes: No data for France and New Zealand. 
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V. Patterns of interdependencies between different 
spheres 
How do pension fund capitalism and its vulnerability to financial market crises fit into the 
overall institutional framework of market economies? On the one hand, the focus of analysis 
is on systematic differences between LMEs, CMEs, and MMEs in sub-spheres shown by 
averages, and on the other hand on the coherence of these groups shown by standard 
deviations (SD). Table 5 gives an overview of the patterns of market economies in inter-firm 
relations, industrial relations, pension fund capitalism and financial crises. According to the 
availability of data, the most recent time periods are listed. Calculations are based on the 
sum of countries‘ means. The averages (in bold) as well as the standard deviations are 
normalized to the range of 0 to 1 in order to make different scales comparable. We prefer 
normalized standard deviation to coefficient of variations because of the sensitivity of the 
latter to small changes and numbers close to zero. The lower the scale, the lower is the 
variation. The aim is not to present another indicator for market economy or coordination but 
rather to give evidence to similarities and differences across countries and within the country 
groups. 
The data confirm our theoretical expectations and first empirical results. CMEs and MMEs 
are characterized by strategic inter-firm relations, which go hand in hand with distinct 
systems of industrial relations, measured by bargaining level and coverage, union density as 
well as status and rights of works councils. In contrast, firms in LMEs are less interrelated 
with each other, even if we see a slight increase between the 1980s and 1990s, and 
continuous and legal relations between social partners are rare. The low scores for standard 
deviations back the classification of countries in LMEs, CMEs, and MMEs. Organized trade 
unions entail organized employers‘ associations and vice versa, resulting in a privileged 
position of representing members‘ interests. This automatically gives authority to social 
partners to build and administer welfare arrangements such as pension funds (in addition to 
e.g. social insurances). At the same time, financial markets are of varying significance in the 
overall market economy of LMEs and CMEs/MMEs that are mirrored in the importance of 
financial markets for old-age security. In LMEs, market-based financial systems have 
developed with external corporate financing via equities and a high stock market 
capitalization. However, in CMEs bank-based financial systems have developed with long-
term investments and strategic inter-firm relationships with a low stock market capitalization. 
The results of pension fund capitalism and financial crisis tie in with the results of the other 
sub-spheres, even if the gap between LMEs and CMEs is smaller. If we take into account the 
coefficient of variations instead of the standard deviation for private pensions as a 
percentage of public pensions, we find more variance within the group of CMEs. In this 
group, especially the Netherlands and Switzerland have substantial expenses for private 
pensions because of their matured multipillar-pension systems. 
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Table 5: Patterns of market economies 
 
LMEs CMEs MMEs 
Market Economy and inter-firm relations 
 1990-95 SD 1990-95 SD 1990-95 SD 
Coordination index (1) 0.18 0.1 0.75 0.2 0.71 0.1 
       
 
1985- 
89 
SD 
1990- 
94 
SD 
1985- 
89 
SD 
1990-
94 
SD 
1985-
89 
SD 
1990-
94 
SD 
Firm alliances (2) 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.4 
Relations purchaser-
supplier (3) 
0.1 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.4 
Relations firms-investors 
(4) 
0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.3 0.9 0.3 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 
Employment security (5) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 
Average (2)-(5)  0.1 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.3 
       
Industrial and employee-management relations 
 
1990- 
99 
SD 
2000- 
09 
SD 
1990- 
99 
SD 
2000-
09 
SD 
1990-
99 
SD 
2000-
09 
SD 
Bargaining level (6) 1.8 0.3 1.6 0.2 3.2 0.2 2.9 0.1 2.8 0.1 2.7 0.1 
Bargaining coverage (7) 43.2 0.2 32.3 0.1 81.3 0.2 81.1 0.2 85.0 0.1 78.5 0.2 
Union Density (8) 33.2 0.1 25.2 0.1 52.2 0.2 46.7 0.2 22.1 0.1 19.6 0.1 
Works council status (9) 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.9 0.2 1.9 0.2 1.8 0.3 1.8 0.3 
Works council rights (10) 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 2.2 0.2 2.2 0.2 1.0 0.3 1.0 0.3 
Average (6)-(10) 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.3 
 
   Pension fund capitalism and financial market crisis 
 
1995 SD 2005 SD 1995 SD 2005 SD 1995 SD 2005 SD 
Private in % public 
pensions (11) 
59 0.2 64 0.3 21 0.2 28 0.3 1 0.0 2 0.0 
 
2001-09 SD 2001-09 SD 2001-09 SD 
Pension fund assets (12) 56.1 0.1 38.4 0.0 6.3 0.0 
Share of equities (13) 51.3 0.0 31.3 0.1 17.3 0.0 
Investment return 2008 
(14) 
-25.8 0.1 -15.2 0.0 -11.6 0.0 
1-Average (11)-(14) 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.9 0.1 
Sources: (1) Hall and Gingerich (2004). 
(2) Huber et al. (2004): Alliances among competing firms for research/development training, 
standard setting, 0=infrequent use, to 1=extensive use of alliances.  
(3) Huber et al. (2004): Long-term relationships between purchaser and supplier firm, 
0=infrequent use, to 1=extensive use of partnerships.  
(4) Huber et al. (2004): Long-term relationships between firms and their investors, 
0=decentralized ownership with high turnovers, to 1=large investors hold significant shares 
for long periods. 
(5) Huber et al. (2004): Long-term employment security guaranteed by firms, 0=uncommon, 
to 1=common.  
(6) Visser (2011): 1=local or company bargaining, to 5=national or central level. 
(7) Visser (2011): Employees covered by bargaining agreements in % of all employees. 
(8) Visser (2011): Net union membership in % of all employees. 
(9) Visser (2011): Status of works councils, 0= no works councils, to 2=existence and rights 
of works councils. 
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(10) Visser (2011): Rights of works councils, 0=no rights, bis 3=economic and social rights 
including co-determination. 
(11) OECD SOCX data: Expenditure for private pensions in % of public pensions; without NZ 
and IT. 
(12) OECD Global Pension Statistics: Pension fund assets in % of GDP. MMEs: 2001/02/09: 
without France. 
(13) OECD Global Pension Statistics and Institutional Investors‘ Assets dataset: share of 
equities in % of total investments. 
(14) OECD (2009: 34): Real investment return of pension funds in 2008. Without New 
Zealand and France. 
Notes: Averages are calculated on standardized values (0-1). SD=standardized standard 
deviation (0-1) 
 
 
 
This is also due to the fact that no data for the nature of pension funds such as the 
participation of unions and work councils are included. Nevertheless, illustrated earlier, 
pension fund capitalism in LMEs differs systematically from pension fund capitalism in CMEs 
and MMEs. Pension fund assets and the share of equities are stable over time, not reflecting 
the differences within the country-groups (because of the shown deviation over time). As a 
result, pension fund capitalism and its vulnerability seem to fit into the institutional 
environment for each country group (LME, CME, and MME), even if differences between 
countries in the CME group are higher compared to the other sub-spheres. 
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VI. Conclusions 
The main aim of the article was to show that there are differences in pension funds‘ 
vulnerabilities to financial market crises, and that these differences are closely related to 
different market economies. Pension funds in LMEs suffered higher losses during the recent 
financial crisis than pension funds in CMEs and MMEs because of their market-based and 
short-term strategies with high shares of equities in the investment portfolio. Beyond these 
results, we recognize the possibilities of higher rates of returns in LMEs with matured 
pension fund systems in times of economic prosperity. 
In line with the variety in the overall public-private pension mix, the scope of pension fund 
capitalism is higher in LMEs, but we also find a few matured occupational pension systems 
in CMEs, especially in the Netherlands and Switzerland. The variance seems to persist over 
time. Even if in most of the countries belonging to CMEs and MMEs pension funds are 
growing in importance, they are still far from the grown systems in LMEs. Additionally, we 
would get similar results if we include pension insurance contracts, which play an important 
role for occupational pensions in Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Similar to 
pension funds in CMEs and MMEs, pension insurance contracts feature more long-term 
investment strategies, usually with (low) guaranteed return rates and more conservative 
assets. In contrast to the scope, qualitative differences between the country groups are more 
evident. Since pension funds in CMEs and MMEs are based on long-term relations and 
strategies, as in other sub-spheres of their market economy, pension funds members are 
involved into the development and administration of funds via works councils and/or trade 
unions. Thus a long-term investment strategy with assets mainly in bonds and loans exists, 
which performed better during the crisis due to their more conservative nature with lower but 
continuous return rates. The higher vulnerability of liberal pension fund capitalism can be 
traced back to lower regulation and coordination (less consideration of the interests of 
pensioners and insured persons) resulting in short-term investment strategies with assets 
mainly in equities in line with our theoretical expectations deducted from the VoC approach. 
This does not mean that complementarities that performed poorly during the financial crisis 
do not provide benefits in other (better) times. Despite deviations also within the country 
groups, characteristics of pension fund capitalism fit quite well into the overall institutional 
setting of market economies. The systematic variety across production regimes is supported 
by the coherence within each group in terms of the sub-spheres inter-firm relations, industrial 
relations, and pension fund capitalism including financial crisis. 
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Limitations to this work are due to partly incomplete OECD data that are nevertheless the 
only information which allow cross-country comparisons of pension fund systems and their 
performance. In order to further validate the results, country specific case studies could be 
explored as a next step. This would allow deeper analyses regarding single country 
regulations and pension funds. 
From a theoretical point of view, we presented a finer tuned version of the VoC approach, 
which allows an application to multipillar-pension systems. So far, this perspective has been 
almost completely ignored as a result of considering pension fund capitalism automatically 
equivalent to LMEs. But, as we were able to show, there is a systematic relationship 
between varieties of market economy and varieties of pension fund capitalism if we highlight 
coordination as the core feature that distinguishes a LME from a CME. Not only the public-
private pension mix and scope of pension fund capitalism alone distinguish a LME from a 
CME and MME, but also the design of pension funds and supplementary pensions in 
general. The development and new forms of pension funds, especially in CMEs and MMEs, 
mirror their specific needs and traditions of coordination. In contrast to their liberal 
counterparts, pension funds in CMEs are higher regulated and members‘ interests are more 
involved. Finally, the findings are also of practical value. The introduction and development of 
funded supplementary pensions is a consequence of the belief in gain resulting from the 
higher profits of financial markets compared to lower returns in public pension systems 
based on tax- or pay-as-you-go-financing. The inherent possible risks of funded pensions 
such as the massive losses in 2002 and 2008/09 have not been taken into consideration. In 
addition, following a recovery in 2010, stock markets (and state bonds of countries such as 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy) are again in trouble in 2011. Since the financial 
crisis is currently turning into a crisis of the real economy and public budgets, we can 
possibly expect a higher vulnerability of pension funds in CMEs/MMEs in the event of 
increasing inflation rates and haircuts due to their high investments in bonds. From a social 
policy point of view it is important to know how to avoid future risks for pension fund 
members and sponsors. Based on the experiences of the current financial market crisis, 
stricter regulations and more inclusive participation of pension fund members could be the 
proper mechanisms in order to downsize losses during the next financial market crisis. 
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